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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Respondent City Electric brought this 
action in the lower court to recover for amounts due for 
electrical materials and supplies purchased on the account 
of defendant-appellant Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth 
(hereinafter "Dean Evans Corp."). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Fourth Judicial Court, the Honorable J. Robert 
Bullock, awarded judgment for City Electric in the principal 
amount of $2,332.76 together with interest at the legal rate 
totalling $432.61 and costs in the amount of $79.00 as of 
January 11, 1982, for a total judgment of $2, 855. 37 as of 
that date, said judgment to bear interest at the rate of 12 
percent per annum from January 11, 1982 until paid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
City Electric seeks affirmance of the judgment of 
the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Appellant's 
Brief (pp. 2-3), as well as several factual assertions made 
1 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in the course of Dean Evans Corp. 's argument are 
unfortunately highly inaccurate in several respects and are 
not supported by the record. The facts as established by 
the record are as follows: 
City Electric is engaged in the business of sales 
of electrical materials and supplies. During the period of 
time relevant to this action, Mr. Don Hatch was in charge of 
the inside sales in City Electric' s Orem store. 
During the same period of time, Mr. M. D. Evans 
(referred to in the record as Mike Evans) was an officer and 
director of Dean Evans Corp. Furthermore, as the trial 
court correctly found, Mr. Mike Evans was acting as sales 
manager and general manager of Dean Evans Corp. and had the 
basic day-to-day charge of the business. (See Findings of 
Fact No. 4 and testimony below contained in Record on Appeal 
(hereinafter referred to as "Rec.") , pp. 61- 62. ) 
During September, 1978, one of the employees of 
Dean Evans Corp. was a Mr. David Sturgill. Prior to his 
employment with Dean Evans Corp., Mr. Sturgill had been an 
employee of the City Electric Orem store. (Rec., p. 61.) 
At the time, Mr. Hatch was aware that Mike Evans was the son 
of Mr. Dean Evans Corp. and understood that Mike Evans had a 
management position with Dean Evans Corp. (Rec., p. 85.) 
2 
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The trial court therefore correctly found (Findings of Fact 
No. 10) that Mr. Hatch understood that Mike Evans was one of 
the owners and had a managerial position with defendant. 
Likewise, of course, Mr. Hatch was aware that Mr. Sturgill 
was employed at Dean Evans Corp. (Rec. , p. 84. ) 
Prior to the transactions in question, Dean Evans 
Corp. had established an open account with plaintiff in 
April, 1978. Charges had been made on this account and had 
been paid by Dean Evans Corp. (Rec., p. 66), as the trial 
court correctly found (Findings of Fact No. 7). 
During early October, 1978, Mr. Sturgill called 
Mr. Hatch at City Electric regarding electrical materials 
and supplies to be purchased by Dean Evans Corp. , and to 
inquire about prices. It is apparent from the record that 
Mr. Sturgill made this inquiry with Mike Evans' approval and 
at his instruction and the trial court correctly so found. 
(See Finding of Fact Nos. 5, 9 and testimony and affidavits 
of Mr. Sturgill and Mr. Hatch below, Rec. pp. 18, 20, 62, 
83-85.) 
It is likewise apparent from the record that Mr. 
Sturgill told Mr. Hatch that he was acting at Mike Evans' 
direction, and that the purchases should be charged to the 
Dean Evans Corp. account. The trial court therefore 
3 
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correctly found that Mike Evans instructed the purchases to 
be charged to the Dean Evans Corp. account and that Mr. 
Sturgill informed Mr. Hatch that the purchase should be so 
charged. (See Findings of Fact Nos. 6 and 9, and affidavits 
and testimony of Mr. Sturgill and Mr. Hatch, Rec. pp. 18, 
20, 62-64, 84-85.) 
At trial, Dean Evans Corp. did not call Mike Evans 
or anyone else to the stand to testify that these 
charges were not authorized, nor did it introduce any other 
evidence to that effect. If such were the case, Dean Evans 
Corp. could easily have presented such evidence. (In fact, 
it introducted no evidence at all at trial and called no 
witnesses.) 
This evidence and the resulting findings of the 
trial court demonstrate the speciousness of Dean Evans 
Corp. 's remarkable assertions that City Electric had 
"unilaterally decided to treat the purchase of the materials 
as an open account item and charge defendant's own credit 
account", and that there was "no written or oral agreement 
between plaintiff and defendant for the payment of the 
materials." (Appellant's Brief, p. 3. ) Likewise, these 
findings and the supporting evidence belie Dean Evans 
Corp. 's assertion that "the only inference that can be made" 
4 
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from Mr. Sturgill's testimony (which Dean Evans Corp. 
miscontrues, at the same time ignoring his affidavit) is 
that Mike Evans and Johnny Rider, individually, were trying 
to open an account for their own credit with City Electric. 
(Appellant's Brief, P.6.) (Furthermore, no mention is made 
in Mr. Hatch's testimony of any request that a new account 
be opened for these two individuals unrelated to the Dean 
Evans Corp. account, nor did defendant elicit such 
testimony or offer any testimony or 
indicating that such a request was made.) 
The trial court found, 
demonstrates, that City Electric relied 
Corp.' s previously established credit in 
sales. (See Findings of Fact No. 13 
evidence at all 
and the record 
upon Dean Evans 
making the subject 
and Mr. Hatch's 
testimony, Rec. pp. 83-85, 92-93.) Indeed, Mr. Hatch 
testified, and the trial court correctly found, that he gave 
a more favorable price to Dean Evans Corp. than would 
otherwise be given to a customer of that type (which had a 
smaller volume of business and which was not an electrical 
contractor), and did so as a favor to Mr. Sturgill. 
Findings of Fact No. 12 and Rec. pp. 8 7- 88.) 
(See 
These findings and evidence belie Dean Evans 
Corp. 's baseless assertions that there was "no evidence. 
5 
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that the goods were furnished by defendant relying on the 
credit or the request of the defendant" and that City 
Electric was "actually relying upon the credit of Mr. 
Sturgill rather than the corporate defendant " 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 9, 10). (Mr. Sturgill, of course, 
was not personally billed, as he would have been if City 
Electric were somehow simply relying on his credit.) 
The findings and record below establish that the 
first two invoices for the subject purchases, dated October 
8, 1978 and October 9, 1978, were paid in December by 
defendant. (See Findings of Fact No. 14, Rec. , p. 6 7.) 
Dean Evans Corp.' s contentions that "there is no reference 
whatsoever" that Dean Evans Corp. paid the invoices and that 
"the only permissible inference" was that "Johnny Rider 
and/or Mike Evans" paid for the items personally 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8) are nothing more than grasping at 
straws. These conjectures are contradicted by the plain 
fact as to who was billed on these invoices, as shown by the 
invoices themselves, namely, Dean Evans Corp. Had Mike 
Evans or Mr. Rider personally paid these invoices, Dean 
Evans Corp. could easily have so proven at trial~ but no 
evidence whatsoever to this ef feet was even offered. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES 
AFFIRMANCE OF THE JUDGMENT 
As the court held in R.C. Tolman Construction Co. 
v. Myton Water Assoc., 563 P.2d 780 (Utah, 1977): 
In analyzing the [appellant's] 
contentions, it is appropriate to have 
in mind these basic rules of review on 
appeal: that we indulge the findings 
and judgment of the trial court with a 
presumption of validity and correctness; 
review the record in the light favorable 
to them; do not disturb them if they 
find substantial support in the 
evidence; and require [appellant] to 
sustain the burden of showing error. 
[Citing Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U.2d 
389, 360 P. 2d 176, and First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. Wright, 521 P.2d 
563.] 
563 P.2d at 782. 
It is readily apparent from the foregoing review 
that the trial court's findings do indeed have "substantial 
support in the evidence" and that appellant Dean Evans Corp. 
has utterly failed to sustain its burden of showing error. 
(Dean Evans Corp. could have easily introduced evidence at 
trial in support of its contentions, if any such evidence 
were available, but it neither introduced any evidence nor 
called any witnesses.) The findings of the trial court are 
correct, and require affirmance of the judgment. 
7 
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II. THE ORAL AGREEMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE MATERIALS 
IS AN ORIGINAL OBLIGATION OF DEAN EVANS CORP. 
The trial court found an employee of Dean Evans 
Corp. contacted City Electric with the authority of the 
corporation's day-to-day manager and director to arrange for 
the purchase of the subject materials to be charged to Dean 
Evans Corp. 's account. The purchase of the materials, 
therefore, constitutes an original agreement on the part of 
Dean Evans Corp. It is therefore not a promise to answer 
for the debt of another under the particular provision of 
the statute of frauds relied upon by Dean Evans Corp. 
( §25-5-4 (2), Utah Code Ann.). 
In addition, Dean Evans Corp. 's Statute of Frauds 
argument is contrary to the applicable authority of this 
court, even if it had no interest in the project where the 
materials were used. In Sugar v. Miller, 6 U.2d 433, 315 
P.2d 862 (1957), a printing establishment had done work for 
a corporate entity at the request of the individual who was 
its principal owner and promoter, and the individual said 
that he would pay for the services performed for the 
corporate entity. The printer performed the services on the 
strength of the requesting individual's credit, just as City 
8 
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Electric furnished the subject materials and supplies here 
on the strength of the requesting corporation's credit. The 
Court held that the promise was therefore an original 
promise and not within §25-5-4(2). The Court held: 
"Where goods are furnished to one person 
upon the credit and request of another, 
it is an original undertaking upon the 
part of the person making the request, 
and is not within the scope of the 
statute of frauds. (Citing cases.) 
"The law is well settled that a seller 
of goods may recover from another person 
on his oral promise to pay, through both 
title and possession of the goods were 
delivered to a person other than the one 
making the promise to pay, where the 
promise was given prior to the delivery 
and induced the seller to part with the 
goods". 
315 P.2d at 865 [quoting Liebman v. Buell Lumber & Mfg. Co, 
67 S.W.2d 1043, 1044 (Tex. Civ. App.)' underlining 
supplied]. 
The trial court found that City Electric furnished 
the materials and extended credit on the strength of Dean 
Evans Corp. 's credit, and the purchases were charged to its 
account for that reason and at the request of its agents. 
Under Sugar v. Miller, therefore, the obligation was an 
9 
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original obligation of Dean Evans Corp., and §25-5-4(2) is 
therefore inapplicable. 
III. BOTH MIKE EVANS AND DAVID STURGILL HAD APPARENT 
AUTHORITY TO ACT ON BEHALF OF DEAN EVANS CORP. 
Not only does the evidence in record demonstrate 
that Mike Evans and Mr. Sturgill had apparent authority to 
act on behalf of Dean Evans Corp. , but there was also no 
evidence whatsoever introduced to demonstrate any lack of 
authority on their part to act on behalf of the corporation 
or that their acts were unauthorized. 
The record below demonstrates that Mike Evans was 
acting as general manager at the time of the subject 
transactions. The acts of Mike Evans, and Mr. Sturgill 
acting on his behalf, as established in the record below are 
within Mike Evan's implied or apparent authority as the 
general manager of Dean Evans Corp. As stated by the court 
in Twisp Mining & Smelting Co. v. Chelan Mining Co., 16 
Wash.2d 264, 133 P.2d 300 (1943): 
We have consistently held that where a 
corporation allows a person in a large 
measure to control its business 
transactions, the corporation must be 
held responsible for his acts in the 
name of the corporation, until it has 
been affirmatively shown that such acts 
were unauthorized. McKinley v. Mineral 
10 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Hill Consolidated Mining Co., 46 Wash. 
162, 89 P. 495. 
133 P. 2d at 312 [underlining supplied]. 
As this court stated in Sullivan v. Evans-Morris-Whitney 
Co., 54 U. 293, 180 P. 435 (1919): 
The term "manager", as applied to 
corporations and business concerns, is 
not unknown to the law. It has a 
comprehensive meaning which is generally 
understood: 
"'Manager' , as applied to an 
officer of a corporation, implies 
the idea that the management of the 
affairs of the company has been 
committed to him so that one 
dealing with a person so held out, 
before the company can be held 
liable for his acts, need not show 
affirmatively that it had 
authorized them." 
And again: 
"'Manager' , as applied to an 
officer of a corporation conveys 
the idea that to the one thus named 
has been committed the management 
of the affairs of the company, and 
one dealing with the person so held 
out may assume that his acts are 
authorized." 5 Words and Phrases, 
p. 4319. 
180 P. at 438 [underlining supplied]. 
The Sullivan case dealt with the apparent 
authority of one who was a branch manager of one branch of a 
11 
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stock brokerage business, and the principle stated applies 
to the acts of one who is in effect the general manager of 
an entire corporation, as was Mike Evans here. 
Therefore, under the facts found by the trial 
court, Dean Evans Corp. is bound by the acts of Mike Evans 
and Mr. Sturgill, as the trial court correctly concluded. 
IV. THE AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE OF THE SUBJECT MATERIALS 
WAS RATIFIED BY DEAN EVANS CORP. BY SUBSEQUENT PAYMENT 
The findings of fact of the trial court 
demonstrate that the first two invoices of the subject 
purchases of materials and supplies were paid in December, 
1978 (after the vast majority, if not all, of the remaining 
deliveries reflected by the remaining invoices had been 
made). 
Payments on corporate obligations incurred by 
officers who, according to the corporation, had no authority 
or power to do so were held to constitute a ratification in 
Cache Valley Banking Co.v. Logan Lodge No. 1453, BPOE, 88 U. 
577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936). See also, e.g., See-Tee Mining 
Corp. v. National Sales, Inc., 76 N.M. 677, 417 P.2d 810 
(1966), and cases ·cited therein. 
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By payment of the first two invoices, Dean Evans 
Corp. ratified both the agreement for purchase of the 
materials and the acts of its general manager and employee. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's findings of fact are supported 
by the record in all respects and must be sustained under 
the applicable standard of review. The findings require 
affirmance of the judgment. The agreement for the purchase 
of the subject materials was an original obligation on the 
part of Dean Evans Corp. and §25-5-4(2), Utah Code Ann., is 
inapplicable. There is no evidence that the acts of Dean 
Evans Corp.' s agents were unauthorized. The trial court 
correctly ruled that Dean Evans Corp. is bound by the acts 
of its officers and agents within the apparent scope of 
their authority. In any event, the agreement, as well as 
the authority of Dean Evans Corp. 's agents, was ratified by 
payment of the first two invoices. 
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1982. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 
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